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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                      
_____________ 
 
Nos. 13-1863 & 13-1936 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Appellant in No. 13-1936 
 
v. 
 
RAYMOND A. NAPOLITAN, 
Appellant in No. 13-1863 
 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 2-11-cr-00146-001 
District Judge: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab 
 
 Appeal No. 13-1863 Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 
34.1 (a) on May 14, 2014 
 
Appeal No. 13-1936 Argued on May 14, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ,  
Circuit Judges 
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_____________________ 
 
  OPINION 
_____________________                              
      
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 Raymond Napolitan was convicted in the United States 
District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania of 
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(B)(ii). He was subsequently sentenced to a term of 
imprisonment of 78 months, which the District Court ordered 
to run consecutively with a sentence Napolitan was already 
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serving on a separate state offense. Napolitan appeals his 
conviction, arguing that a new trial is warranted because two 
of the Government’s witnesses testified falsely at trial. The 
Government cross-appeals from the judgment of sentence, 
arguing that the District Court erred in refusing to impose 
sentencing enhancements under U.S.S.G. §§ 2D1.1(b)(1) and 
3C1.1. For the reasons expressed below, we will affirm 
Napolitan’s conviction, but will vacate his sentence and 
remand for resentencing.  
I. 
 On June 29, 2007, four police officers with the 
Southwest Mercer County Regional Police Department were 
dispatched to Napolitan’s home in response to a 911 call. 
Although no one was at the home when the officers arrived, 
Lisa Rodemoyer—Napolitan’s live-in girlfriend of seven 
years—arrived within a few minutes and invited the officers 
inside. Once inside, the officers discovered a loaded 
Browning .32 caliber handgun on the fireplace mantel. One of 
the officers cleared the weapon, then stepped into Napolitan’s 
office to use the light from a desk lamp to read the serial 
number. There on the desk, the officer observed a box of 
sandwich baggies, a coffee grinder, a digital scale, and white 
powder residue. Suspecting drug activity, the officers 
departed Napolitan’s home and obtained a search warrant. 
 In the search of the home that followed, the officers 
found a .22 caliber handgun sitting on top of a locked gun 
safe in a closet connected to the office. They also found a bag 
of Inositol, a cutting agent used by cocaine traffickers to 
dilute the drug. Unable to open the safe, investigators asked 
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Corporal John Rococi, who had a prior relationship with 
Napolitan, to call Napolitan and ask for the combination. 
Rococi reported back that, in response to his request, 
Napolitan stated: “If they get into that safe, I’m hit.” App. 
127. Napolitan declined to provide the combination to the 
safe so that investigators had to engage a locksmith to open it.  
The safe contained a variety of firearms, including a 
.25 caliber Dickson Detective semi-automatic handgun, a .32 
caliber Colt semi-automatic handgun, six shotguns, ten long 
rifles, and one black powder rifle. It also contained $9,235 in 
cash, Napolitan’s checkbook, and a variety of painkillers 
prescribed for Napolitan. Most importantly, it contained 
nearly one kilogram of cocaine powder.  
Napolitan was arrested a few days later and 
subsequently charged in a two-count indictment with 
possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of 
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 
(b)(1)(B)(ii), and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a 
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
Napolitan chose to go to trial, and maintained that the drugs 
belonged to Rodemoyer. He took the stand in his own defense 
and admitted ownership of the safe and most of its other 
contents, but claimed that he did not know about the drugs. 
Although acknowledging that Rodemoyer did not know the 
combination to the safe, Napolitan claimed that she accessed 
it using a large skeleton key (between eight and twelve inches 
in length) which she had ordered directly from the 
manufacturer. Napolitan explained that Rodemoyer would 
insert this key into a slot that was revealed by unscrewing and 
removing the combination pad affixed to the front of the safe. 
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Napolitan’s defense also included the testimony of a longtime 
friend, Scott Trepanosky, who testified to having heard 
rumors that Rodemoyer sold cocaine in the past and that he 
had seen Rodemoyer open the safe with a skeleton key. 
 Prosecutors did not have knowledge of Napolitan’s 
allegations against Rodemoyer at the time she testified for the 
Government. As a witness in the Government’s case-in-chief, 
she conceded that she had never seen Napolitan deal drugs. 
She did state, however, that she heard him talk on the phone 
in coded language and that she was sometimes asked to leave 
the house she shared with him or stay in a bedroom when 
people came to the house. On direct examination, Rodemoyer 
testified that she neither knew the combination to the safe nor 
had access to its contents. She affirmed this position on cross-
examination, providing the following response which is 
relevant to this appeal: 
Q:  Okay. And it is your testimony that you 
never had access to that safe? 
A:  Correct. 
App. 77. And Rodemoyer repeated this position on re-
cross: 
Q: And again, you’re telling us that you 
never went in that safe, and you couldn’t 
have gotten in? 
A:  No. 
Q: That’s what your testimony was? 
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A: Yes. 
App. 82. Significantly, neither the prosecution nor the defense 
asked Rodemoyer whether she had ever possessed a skeleton 
key that could have been used to access the safe. 
 Among the various other witnesses for the 
Government was Sergeant Charles Rubano, who testified 
concerning the contents of the safe and other items recovered 
during the search of the home. Relevant for purposes of this 
appeal, Sergeant Rubano provided the following testimony 
about finding a skeleton key inside the safe: 
Q:  And at some point did you find a key to that 
safe? 
 A: Yeah. The key was inside the safe. 
 Q: You found no other keys? 
 A: Correct. 
App. 93. 
 Throughout the trial, the Government belittled 
Napolitan’s claim that Rodemoyer obtained her own key to 
the safe. During its cross-examination of Napolitan, the 
Government pointedly asked how it was that Rodemoyer 
accessed the safe with a skeleton key when no such key had 
been recovered outside the safe. App. 211–12. The 
Government also rebuffed Napolitan’s “key theory” during its 
closing argument to the jury:  
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Now, Mr. Napolitan said in his testimony that 
there were multiple keys. Did you see multiple 
keys here today? Did you see other keys to the 
safe that were possessed by Lisa or anyone 
else? This was a long skeleton type key. Clearly 
the police would have found and seized that. 
App. 229. 
The jury ultimately convicted Napolitan on count one, 
possession with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of 
cocaine. The jury did not consider the firearm charge in count 
two because the District Court granted Napolitan’s Rule 29 
motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the 
Government’s case-in-chief.1 
The day before Napolitan was set to be sentenced, 
Rodemoyer contacted the prosecutor and informed him that, 
six to eight months before the drugs were discovered, she had 
in fact purchased a key to the safe from the manufacturer. The 
                                                 
1
  The District Court’s invocation of Rule 29 to dismiss 
the firearms charge before the case went to the jury rendered 
its decision not appealable. See United States v. Scott, 437 
U.S. 82, 91 (1978) (“A judgment of acquittal, whether based 
on a jury verdict of not guilty or on a ruling by the court that 
the evidence is insufficient to convict, may not be appealed 
and terminates the prosecution when a second trial would be 
necessitated by a reversal.”). In an attempt to preserve the 
right of appeal, the Government asked the Court to hold its 
decision in abeyance until after count two was submitted to 
the jury. The Court denied this request. App. 177–78. 
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prosecutor immediately relayed this information to defense 
counsel. At the sentencing hearing, Rodemoyer testified that 
she had ordered the key because she had wanted to leave 
Napolitan—who was physically abusing her—but first 
needed to recover her driver’s license, birth certificate, and 
Social Security card, all of which Napolitan kept locked in the 
safe. Rodemoyer claimed, however, that Napolitan found the 
key a few days later, punched her in the face, and took it 
away from her before she could use it. In response to defense 
counsel’s questions, Rodemoyer explained that she did not 
inform the prosecutor about the key sooner because no one 
asked her at trial whether she herself had a key. Further, she 
explained that she was not alerted to the issue because she 
had not attended any aspect of the trial other than her own 
testimony and was thus not aware of Napolitan’s allegation 
that she had accessed the safe with a key. App. 417–18. 
Sergeant Rubano also testified at the sentencing 
hearing, revisiting his earlier trial testimony about the items 
discovered in the safe. Rubano reported that investigators had 
recovered two keys inside the safe: 
Q: Other than the key found inside the safe, 
the key or keys found inside the safe, did 
you find any other keys? 
A: No. Just the two keys. 
Q: So there are two keys in the safe? 
A:  Special keys for opening safes, yes. 
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App. 430. Defense counsel asked Rubano whether he had 
testified at trial that only one key was recovered, but Rubano 
asserted that he did not remember making such a statement. 
He also stated that the two keys had not been noted on his 
inventory sheet because they were found after the initial 
search when investigators discovered a false bottom in the 
safe. 
 In light of the testimony offered at the hearing, the 
District Judge decided to have the parties brief any new 
issues, and he rescheduled the sentencing hearing for a later 
date. In the interim, Napolitan moved the Court to reconsider 
his previously filed Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal 
on count one. He argued that new facts discovered at the 
sentencing hearing—i.e., that Rodemoyer had ordered a key 
to the safe and that law enforcement had recovered two keys 
inside the safe—made it apparent that the prosecution had 
introduced false testimony at trial. Although the motion was 
cast as one under Rule 29, the District Court orally agreed to 
consider it also as one under Rule 33 (motion for new trial) 
and Rule 34 (motion for arrest of judgment). Concluding that 
the trial testimony was not inconsistent with the sentencing 
testimony, the Court denied the motions.  
The presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 
recommended imposing separate enhancements under 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1), for possession of a firearm in 
connection with a drug offense, and under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, 
because Napolitan obstructed justice by testifying falsely at 
trial. With the inclusion of these enhancements, Napolitan’s 
Guidelines range was 121 to 151 months.  
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The District Court, however, refused to apply § 
2D1.1(b)(1)’s firearm enhancement, stating: 
I think the firearms are not the type of firearms 
that certainly are used by gun [sic] dealers. 
Having had two extensive gang/drug related 
cases over the last couple years . . . , these are 
not the type of firearms in my experience . . . 
that are used in connection with drug 
trafficking.  
App. 404–05. The judge did not directly address the handguns 
in the safe or the .22 caliber pistol on top of the safe, and he 
only briefly mentioned the loaded Browning .32 caliber 
handgun discovered on the mantel, concluding that its 
presence did not require imposition of the enhancement 
because it “was not physically in the same room” and “was 
certainly not within a ‘few feet’ of the safe.” App. 405. The 
Court also incorporated its opinion and statements regarding 
dismissal of the § 924(c) charge as an additional basis for 
rejecting the firearm enhancement, including the statement 
that Napolitan had “a constitutional right to carry a handgun 
that’s legally owned by him around his house.” App. 176, 
405. 
 The District Court also refused to apply the obstruction 
of justice enhancement in § 3C1.1. The Court explained: 
I don’t know that the record supports it, and I 
am concerned that it really has a chilling effect 
on a Defendant that provides a defense in the 
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case, including taking the stand or putting 
witnesses on the stand. 
App. 466. Beyond this statement, the Court did not provide 
any further explanation for his refusal to apply the 
enhancement. 
Without the two enhancements, Napolitan’s 
Sentencing Guidelines range dropped to between 78 and 97 
months. The District Court sentenced Napolitan at the bottom 
of the range to 78 months in prison, and ordered that the 
federal sentence run consecutively with a state sentence he 
was already serving for sexually assaulting Rodemoyer.  
These consolidated appeals timely followed.
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II. 
We first address the issues raised in Napolitan’s 
appeal. Napolitan argues that a new trial is warranted because 
new evidence revealed at sentencing shows that his 
conviction was based on falsified testimony. Napolitan argues 
that Rodemoyer testified falsely when she claimed she never 
had access to the safe, and that Sergeant Rubano testified 
                                                 
2
  The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231. We have jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(b). 
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falsely by suggesting he found only one key inside it. We 
disagree.
3
  
Our court has identified five requirements that a 
defendant must satisfy before he will be granted a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence. The defendant 
must (1) identify newly discovered evidence; (2) allege facts 
from which his diligence can be inferred; (3) demonstrate the 
evidence is not merely cumulative or impeaching; (4) show 
the evidence is material to the issues involved; and (5) show 
the evidence is such that, if introduced at trial, it would 
probably produce an acquittal. United States v. Kelly, 539 
F.3d 172, 181–82 (3d Cir. 2008). “Although the decision to 
grant or deny a motion for a new trial lies within the 
                                                 
3
  Napolitan also argues that the District Court abused its 
discretion when it ordered his federal sentence to run 
consecutively with a state sentence he was already serving. In 
announcing its decision to make the two sentences run 
consecutively, the District Court explained that its policy was 
to make “separate sentences run consecutively if they involve 
separate crimes.” App. 473. Napolitan argues that the Court 
committed procedural error by basing its decision to impose a 
consecutive sentence on its sentencing practice, rather than on 
an individualized assessment of the factors set forth in 18 
U.S.C. § 3553(a). This issue is rendered moot by our 
decision, discussed below, to vacate Napolitan’s sentence 
based on an erroneous application of the Sentencing 
Guidelines. On remand, the District Court will have an 
opportunity to impose a consecutive sentence, if it so chooses, 
and should connect its decision to do so with its consideration 
of the § 3553(a) factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(b). 
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discretion of the district court, the movant has a ‘heavy 
burden’ of proving each of these requirements.” Id. (quoting 
United States v. Cimera, 459 F.3d 452, 458 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
“If just one of the requirements is not satisfied, a defendant’s 
Rule 33 motion must fail.” Id. (citing United States v. Jasin, 
280 F.3d 355, 365 (3d Cir. 2002)). 
 We begin with Rodemoyer’s testimony. The 
prosecutor’s examination of Rodemoyer only briefly 
addressed her connection to the gun safe. He asked 
Rodemoyer whether she knew the combination to the safe or 
otherwise had access to it, to which she twice responded, 
“No.” App. 70–71. Defense counsel’s inquiry was equally 
limited, consisting of just two leading questions, which 
prompted Rodemoyer’s agreement that she “never had access 
to [the] safe” and “never went in the safe, and . . . couldn’t 
have gotten in.” App. 77 & 82. Napolitan argues that these 
statements are inconsistent with Rodemoyer’s testimony at 
the sentencing hearing. There, Rodemoyer admitted that she 
had purchased a key several months before the drugs were 
found but that Napolitan had beaten her and taken it away 
before she had been able to use it. App. 409–10. 
As a preliminary matter, Napolitan cannot claim that 
Rodemoyer falsely denied ever having a key to the safe. At 
trial, the subject was simply not inquired into by either side. 
Neither the prosecution nor the defense asked Rodemoyer 
whether she possessed a key to the safe at the time the drugs 
were discovered or at any time prior to that. Defense 
counsel’s failure to ask Rodemoyer about the key is 
noteworthy considering that the “key theory” was central to 
Napolitan’s defense. See United States v. Whiteford, 676 F.3d 
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348, 361 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that defendant arguably 
fell short of the diligence requirement in failing to cross-
examine witness regarding the issue raised on appeal). 
Without direct testimony concerning the key, these 
two sets of statements are inconsistent only if we conclude 
that Rodemoyer’s brief possession of a key several months 
before the drugs were recovered conflicts with her statement 
at trial that she “never had access to the safe.” We agree with 
the District Court that these statements are not necessarily 
inconsistent. Rodemoyer testified at the sentencing hearing 
that Napolitan beat her and forcefully seized the key not long 
after she obtained it and before she had an opportunity to use 
it. We accept this statement as true and have no reason to 
doubt Rodemoyer’s subjective belief that she lacked access to 
the safe, even during the brief period when the key was in her 
possession. At the very least, there is simply not enough here 
for us to conclude that a jury presented with this testimony 
would have acquitted Napolitan of the charge. Indeed, even if 
evidence at sentencing had revealed that Rodemoyer had 
access to the safe at the time the drugs were discovered 
(which it did not), Napolitan could still have been convicted 
on a theory of constructive possession. It was undisputed that 
he had ready access to the safe and used it to store his 
belongings. 
We are likewise not persuaded by Napolitan’s 
assertion that Sergeant Rubano’s trial testimony was false. 
The prosecutor asked Rubano two questions regarding the 
safe key. First, he asked whether Rubano found “a key” to the 
safe, to which Rubano responded, “Yeah. The key was inside 
the safe.” App. 93. The prosecutor followed up by asking, 
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“You found no other keys?,” to which Rubano responded, 
“Correct.” Id. At sentencing, Rubano testified that his team 
recovered two skeleton keys on a single ring in a false bottom 
of the safe. 
Although the prosecutor’s questions during trial 
referred to “a key” in the singular, the record does not 
necessarily indicate that Rubano intended to take the position 
that only one key was found in the safe. Rubano may have 
understood the prosecutor to have been asking whether a key 
was recovered outside the safe (i.e., where Rodemoyer could 
have utilized it). A focus on where the key was found—as 
opposed to how many keys were found—is consistent with 
the point the Government pressed during summation, when it 
argued that if Rodemoyer had a key it would have been found 
outside the safe.  
Yet even if Rubano’s statements are inconsistent, such 
inconsistency does not equate to falsity that comes with the 
implication that the witness was deliberately withholding 
material information. Rather, this discrepancy was most likely 
due to Rubano’s faulty memory on a point that had little 
consequence to the trial. Indeed, whether one key or two keys 
were recovered was immaterial. In either event, the keys were 
in the one place Rodemoyer could not get them: inside the 
safe. Furthermore, we again emphasize that defense counsel 
did not make a diligent effort to explore this issue with 
Rubano while he was on the stand, failing to ask even a single 
question regarding the number of keys found in the safe.  
There were multiple avenues available for Napolitan to 
explore these issues during trial, most notably by asking 
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direct questions to Rubano and Rodemoyer regarding his 
theory that Rodemoyer possessed a key to the safe. Napolitan 
did not avail himself of these opportunities. Because he did 
not exercise diligence in exploring these matters during trial, 
Napolitan cannot now parse each word in the record in an 
attempt to gin up a claim of prosecutorial misconduct. We can 
find no support for Napolitan’s claim that newly discovered 
evidence warrants a new trial. Napolitan’s conviction will be 
affirmed.
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III. 
In its cross-appeal, the Government contends that the 
District Court erred by refusing to apply two sentencing 
enhancements recommended in the PSR: (1) an enhancement 
for possessing a firearm in connection with a drug offense 
under U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 and (2) an enhancement for 
obstructing justice by committing perjury on the stand under 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Because we find procedural errors in the 
District Court’s assessment of both of these enhancements, 
                                                 
4
  Napolitan also seeks a new trial under the Due Process 
Clause on the basis of alleged prosecutorial misconduct. 
Because Napolitan failed to preserve this argument, we 
review this claim for plain error. Napolitan cannot show that 
it was plain error not to grant a new trial because, among 
other things, he has not shown the Government knew or 
should have known that Rodemoyer or Rubano provided 
inaccurate, let alone perjurious, testimony. 
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we will vacate Napolitan’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing.
5
 
A. 
We begin by addressing the District Court’s refusal to 
apply the firearm enhancement set forth in U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1(b)(1). We review a district court’s factual 
determinations for clear error. United States v. Drozdowski, 
313 F.3d 819, 822 (3d Cir. 2002). We find clear error if, when 
reviewing the entire record, we are “left with the definite and 
firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” United 
States v. Kulick, 629 F.3d 165, 168 (3d Cir. 2010). We apply 
plenary review to a district court’s interpretation of the 
Sentencing Guidelines. United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 
1074, 1080 (3d Cir. 1995). 
                                                 
5
  After both parties filed their notices of appeal, the 
District Court sua sponte issued an amended judgment 
pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 36. The amended judgment 
purported to make clerical modifications, but also removed 
language in the original judgment providing that Napolitan’s 
federal sentence was to run consecutive to a state sentence he 
was already serving. The Government argues that removing 
this language constituted an impermissible substantive 
modification, and thus asks that we vacate the amended 
judgment and remand with instructions that the new judgment 
be brought into accord with the oral pronouncement of 
sentence. This issue is rendered moot by our decision to 
vacate the judgment on other grounds. On remand, the 
District Court is instructed to ensure that the written judgment 
is consistent with the oral pronouncement of sentence. 
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When a defendant is convicted of a drug trafficking 
offense, U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1) provides that “[i]f a 
dangerous weapon (including a firearm) was possessed,” the 
sentencing calculation should be “increase[d] by 2 levels.” 
The commentary to this Guideline explains that the 
enhancement “reflects the increased danger of violence when 
drug traffickers possess weapons.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. 
n.11. According to the commentary, “[t]he enhancement 
should be applied if the weapon was present, unless it is 
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected with the 
offense.” Id. (emphasis added). To illustrate when it might be 
clearly improbable that a weapon is connected to the offense, 
the commentary explains that “the enhancement would not be 
applied if the defendant, arrested at the defendant’s residence, 
had an unloaded hunting rifle in the closet.” Id. We have 
noted that the clearly improbable standard presents a 
significant hurdle that “defendants have rarely been able to 
overcome.” Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 822. 
 “[T]he question of whether it is clearly improbable 
that a gun was used in connection with a drug offense is a 
fact-bound determination.” Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 823. We 
have identified four factors relevant to this inquiry: 
(1) the type of gun involved, with clear 
improbability less likely with handguns than 
with hunting rifles, (2) whether the gun was 
loaded, (3) whether the gun was stored near the 
drugs or drug paraphernalia, and (4) . . . 
whether the gun was accessible. 
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Id. at 822–23 (internal citations omitted).  
During the sentencing hearing, the Government 
correctly noted that, because a weapon was found at the 
house, the firearm enhancement should be applied “unless it’s 
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the 
offense.” App. 401. The prosecutor then addressed the 
Drozdowski factors and argued that all four weighed in favor 
of the enhancement. He emphasized that the Browning .32 
caliber handgun found just outside the office “was a loaded 
handgun found directly near the cocaine within feet of it, and 
[was] obviously accessible, as it was right on the mantle 
[sic].” App. 402. Further, the Government contended that the 
enhancement was applicable in “consider[ation] [of] the fact 
that [an] additional two other handguns [were] found, one on 
the safe, one inside the safe, and as well as [the fact that] the 
hunting rifle[s] were all found directly next to the nearly one 
kilogram of cocaine.” App. 403.  
The District Court rejected these arguments, giving the 
following explanation for its refusal to apply the 
enhancement: 
I don’t believe the enhancement is applicable 
here. I think the firearms are not the type of 
firearms that certainly are used by gun [sic] 
dealers. Having had two extensive gang/drug 
related cases over the last couple years . . . , 
these are not the type of firearms in my 
experience . . . that are used in connection with 
drug trafficking. Secondly, the one weapon 
that’s pointed to, again, was not physically in 
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the same room; and at least as I remember the 
testimony, it was certainly not within a “few 
feet” of the safe. 
App. 404–05 (emphasis added). 
Based on this discussion, we must conclude that the 
District Court misapplied the relevant standard under § 
2D1.1(b)(1). Notably absent from the District Court’s 
analysis is any reference to the “clearly improbable” standard 
set forth in the commentary to § 2D1.1. Instead, the Court 
rejected the enhancement because the guns recovered were  
“not the type of firearms that certainly are used by [drug] 
dealers.” App. 404–05 (emphasis added). But the 
Government is not required to show that the firearms were 
“certainly” the type used by drug dealers. Such a requirement 
tortures the clearly improbable standard and plainly sets the 
bar too high.  
The government bears the burden of proving by a 
preponderance of the evidence that a sentencing enhancement 
applies. See United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 568 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc). With respect to § 2D1.1(b)(1), the 
government must show only that the defendant “possessed” a 
dangerous weapon, and it can do so by establishing “that a 
temporal and spatial relation existed between the weapon, the 
drug trafficking activity, and the defendant.” United States v. 
Ruiz, 621 F.3d 390, 396 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting United 
States v. Cisneros-Gutierrez, 517 F.3d 751, 764–65 (5th Cir. 
2008)). Once the government makes out a prima facie 
showing that the defendant drug-dealer possessed a weapon, 
the burden of production shifts to the defendant to 
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demonstrate that the connection between the weapon and the 
drug offense was “clearly improbable.” See United States v. 
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 514 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 133 
S. Ct. 375 (2012) (explaining that once the government has 
met its burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to present 
evidence showing the drug-weapon connection was “clearly 
improbable”). We emphasize that the ultimate burden of 
proving the applicability of the enhancement remains at all 
times with the government. But once the government has 
made a prima facie showing that the defendant possessed the 
weapon, the enhancement should be applied unless the 
defendant can demonstrate that the drug-weapon connection 
was clearly improbable. 
This burden shifting approach follows from the plain 
language of U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The Guideline itself does 
not require a connection between the firearm and the drug 
offense, but requires only that the firearm was “possessed” by 
the defendant. U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1). The commentary 
elaborates on the possession requirement, explaining that the 
adjustment should be applied “if the weapon was present, 
unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon was connected 
with the offense.” U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1 cmt. n.11 (emphasis 
added). The term “unless” creates an exception to the general 
rule that the enhancement should be applied if a firearm was 
present. And the party seeking the exception, here the 
defendant, bears the burden of showing that he qualifies for 
its invocation. 
We have not previously described the shifting burdens 
under § 2D1.1(b)(1) in this manner. See United States v. 
Thornton, 306 F.3d 1355, 1357 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting only 
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dicta from our court on the issue). In adopting this burden-
shifting framework today, we join the vast majority of our 
sister circuits that have addressed the question. See, e.g., Ruiz, 
621 F.3d at 396 (“The Government bears the burden of 
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant possessed the weapon . . . . If the Government 
meets that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show 
that it was clearly improbable that the weapon was connected 
with the offense.”); United States v. Smythe, 363 F.3d 127, 
128 (2d Cir. 2004) (articulating same burden shifting 
approach); United States v. Fudge, 325 F.3d 910, 922 (7th 
Cir. 2003) (same); United States v. Alexander, 292 F.3d 1226, 
1231 (10th Cir. 2002) (same); United States v. Harris, 128 
F.3d 850, 853 (4th Cir. 1997) (same); United States v. Hill, 79 
F.3d 1477, 1485 (6th Cir. 1996) (same); United States v. Hall, 
46 F.3d 62, 63 (11th Cir. 1995) (same); United States v. 
Corcimiglia, 967 F.2d 724, 727–28 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); 
United States v. Restrepo, 884 F.2d 1294, 1296 (9th Cir. 
1989) (same). 
Only the Eighth Circuit has staked out a different path, 
declaring that “[t]he government must . . . show that it is not 
clearly improbable that the weapon was connected to the drug 
offense.” United States v. Peroceski, 520 F.3d 886, 889 (8th 
Cir. 2008). We consider this approach logistically 
problematic. It would essentially require the government to 
prove a negative—i.e., that a connection between a weapon 
and the defendant’s drug activity was “probably not clearly 
improbable”—before the sentencing court could impose the 
enhancement. But more importantly, we believe such an 
approach is inconsistent with the text of § 2D1.1 and for that 
reason decline to adopt it as the law of this circuit. 
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The Government here met its burden of showing that 
Napolitan possessed a weapon. It presented evidence that the 
safe where the drugs were found was filled with firearms of 
all types, and that there were two other handguns outside the 
safe in the general vicinity of the drugs and drug 
paraphernalia. Thus, the burden of production should have 
shifted to Napolitan to come forward with evidence showing 
that the connection between the firearms and the drug offense 
was clearly improbable. Instead of following this procedure, 
the District Court required the Government to prove that the 
guns were “certainly” the type used by drug dealers. 
Imposing such a burden on the Government was improper. 
Our conclusion that the Court misapplied the standard 
is not based solely on the fact that the Court never invoked 
the term “clearly improbable.” This omission might be 
forgivable if the record indicated that the Court otherwise 
considered the pertinent factors we have identified for the 
clearly improbable determination. See Drozdowski, 313 F.3d 
at 822–23. But the record does not provide such an indication.  
As already noted, the Government argued at 
sentencing that the enhancement was warranted based on any 
one of the three handguns found in or around the safe. 
Specifically with respect to the .32 caliber on the mantel, the 
Government argued that the Drozdowski factors favored 
application of the enhancement because it was (1) a handgun 
(which is generally the type of firearm involved in drug 
trafficking crimes), (2) loaded, (3) in close proximity to 
where the drug paraphernalia was first observed because it 
was just outside the only entrance to the office, and (4) easily 
accessible. Despite the Government’s methodical discussion 
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of each of the four Drozdowski factors, the only reason 
provided by the District Court for not applying the 
enhancement was that the .32 caliber handgun on the mantel 
“was not physically in the same room” as the drugs and “not 
within a few feet of the safe.” App. 405. This statement fell 
woefully short of the analysis that was required. 
As a preliminary matter, the Court failed to 
acknowledge either the .22 caliber pistol sitting on top of the 
safe or the handguns inside the safe, all of which the 
Government explicitly referenced in support of the 
enhancement. Because we are unable to evaluate whether the 
Court properly considered these weapons in light of the four 
Drozdowski factors, we must assume it did not.  
With respect to the Browning .32 caliber pistol (which 
the Court did address), the Court noted only that this firearm 
was “not within a ‘few feet’ of the safe” where the drugs were 
stored. App. 405. This statement, however, ignores the gun’s 
proximity to the desk where the sandwich baggies, digital 
scale, and other drug paraphernalia were first observed. Our 
cases demonstrate that § 2D1.1 may apply even where “there 
were no drugs in the house,” provided the gun was found near 
other indicia of drug activity. See Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 
823 (applying enhancement where guns were discovered near 
“a great deal of drug paraphernalia,” including “a large 
number of zip-lock bags,” a bag of Inositol, and “owe 
sheets”). It was undisputed that this gun was recovered mere 
“steps” from the contraband on the desk.6 This fact should 
                                                 
6
  At oral argument, defense counsel conceded that “it is 
a small house, so it is steps [from the mantel] to the office.” 
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have been considered as part of the Court’s analysis. Id. at 
822 (listing as a factor “whether the gun was stored near the 
drugs or drug paraphernalia”) (emphasis added).  
The Court also placed too much emphasis on the fact 
that the Browning .32 caliber pistol was “not physically in the 
same room” as the drugs. The firearm enhancement may be 
appropriate in circumstances where weapons are found in a 
room other than the one where the contraband was ultimately 
discovered. See Drozdowski, 313 F.3d at 821 (applying 
enhancement despite that “there were no drugs in the house” 
where the firearms were discovered). Where, as here, a 
loaded handgun is found a few steps from a substantial 
collection of drug paraphernalia, a clearly improbable finding 
cannot be based solely on the fact that the gun was just 
beyond the only entrance to the room where the paraphernalia 
was recovered. Under these circumstances, a proper analysis 
requires consideration of the totality of the Drozdowski 
factors.  
Rather than analyzing the four Drozdowski factors, the 
Court provided its own alternative grounds for denying the 
enhancement. First, it relied on its own personal experience 
with “two extensive gang/drug related cases,” stating that this 
experience supported its finding that the guns were “not the 
type” used by drug dealers. App. 405. As defense counsel 
conceded at oral argument, the sentencing judge’s previous 
trial experience was not evidence offered at sentencing and 
was not a proper basis for denying the enhancement. Second, 
the Court incorporated its reason underlying its previous 
dismissal of the 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) count, including its 
suggestion that Napolitan “has a constitutional right to carry a 
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handgun that’s legally owned by him around his house.” App. 
176, 405. Needless to say, while the Second Amendment 
secures “the right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use 
arms in defense of hearth and home,” District of Columbia v. 
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008), it does not entitle a drug 
trafficker to carry a firearm in furtherance of his criminal 
exploits, nor does it have any bearing on the application of 
U.S.S.G. § 2D1.1(b)(1)’s firearm enhancement.  
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the District 
Court misapplied the controlling standard under U.S.S.G. § 
2D1.1. We will vacate Napolitan’s sentence and remand for 
resentencing consistent with the burden-shifting procedure 
outlined in this opinion. 
B. 
 The Government next argues that the District Court 
erred in refusing to apply a two-level enhancement under 
U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1, because Napolitan committed perjury at 
trial. Section 3C1.1 provides for a two-level enhancement if a 
defendant “willfully obstructed or impeded, or attempted to 
obstruct or impede, the administration of justice with respect 
to the . . . prosecution” through conduct that related to “the 
defendant’s offense of conviction.” U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. The 
commentary provides that offering perjurious testimony 
constitutes an obstruction of justice. See U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1 
cmt. n.4(B). A defendant who testifies under oath at trial 
commits perjury within § 3C1.1 if he “gives false testimony 
concerning a material matter with the willful intent to provide 
false testimony, rather than as a result of confusion, mistake, 
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or faulty memory.” United States v. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. 87, 
94 (1993). 
 The Government contends that Napolitan committed 
perjury within this definition when he testified on direct and 
cross-examination that he was unaware of both the cocaine 
stored in his safe and the drug paraphernalia scattered 
throughout his home office.
7
 It further argues that these 
                                                 
7
  The following excerpts from Napolitan’s direct 
examination are relevant to the Government’s claim that he 
committed perjury: 
 
Q: Okay. Did you ever see any cocaine in 
the safe until they seized the safe and 
showed you the evidence? 
A. No, sir. 
. . . .  
Q: Were you dealing drugs out of your 
home in Farrell? 
A: No, sir.  
 
App. 202–03. Additionally, the Government cites the 
following exchange, which occurred on cross-examination 
following multiple questions regarding the “digital scales,” 
“plastic baggies with the corners cut off,” and “inositol” 
found in Napolitan’s home office: 
 
Q: So you never walked by the office? 
A: Yes. I did. 
Q: You never saw evidence of drug 
packaging going on? 
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denials were made with willful intent to mislead the jury 
regarding a material issue, namely his possession of the 
cocaine with the intent to distribute it. According to the 
Government, the falsity of Napolitan’s testimony was 
established through the testimony of the Government’s 
witnesses, including Rodemoyer, and was necessarily implicit 
in the jury’s verdict finding Napolitan guilty of the charged 
drug-trafficking offense. 
 The District Court denied the Government’s request 
for a perjury enhancement under § 3C1.1, offering the 
following explanation for its decision: 
I don’t know that the record supports it, and I 
am concerned that it really has a chilling effect 
on a Defendant that provides a defense in the 
case, including taking the stand or putting 
witnesses on the stand. 
App. 466. The Government argues that both of these grounds 
were improper. First, it argues that the District Court 
impermissibly based its determination on a policy concern 
that imposition of the perjury enhancement will have a 
“chilling effect” on a defendant’s right to testify. Second, the 
Government contends that the Court’s assertion, “I don’t 
know that the record supports it,” was not a sufficient factual 
finding to support its decision. “We review the factual 
findings underlying the District Court’s perjury determination 
                                                                                                             
A: No, sir. 
 
App. 218.  
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for clear error, while exercising plenary review over the 
District Court’s conclusions of law.” United States v. Miller, 
527 F.3d 54, 75 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 We agree that a district court cannot refuse to apply § 
3C1.1 based solely on a policy concern that the enhancement 
deters defendants from exercising their fundamental right to 
testify at trial. Whatever the merit of such a concern, that ship 
has sailed. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected the 
argument that permitting a perjury enhancement under 
§ 3C1.1 unconstitutionally infringes on a defendant’s right to 
testify. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 96 (“Respondent cannot 
contend that increasing her sentence because of her perjury 
interferes with her right to testify, for we have held on a 
number of occasions that a defendant’s right to testify does 
not include a right to commit perjury.”). See also United 
States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 479 (3d Cir. 1996) (noting that 
Dunnigan rejected the argument that the perjury enhancement 
penalizes a defendant for testifying at trial because “a 
defendant’s right to testify does not include a right to commit 
perjury”). For this reason, it is reversible error for a district 
court to reject § 3C1.1 based only on this policy concern. 
That said, the District Judge here did not reject the 
enhancement solely on policy grounds. He also stated: “I 
don’t know that the record supports it.” App. 466. We must, 
therefore, evaluate the sufficiency of this alternative reason.  
The Government argues that the District Court’s 
comment, “I don’t know that the record supports [the 
enhancement],” was insufficient because it does not constitute 
a factual finding that Napolitan did or did not commit perjury. 
In support of its argument that more substantial findings were 
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required, the Government relies principally on the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Dunnigan. In that case, the Court held that 
whenever a defendant challenges a sentencing enhancement 
under § 3C1.1 based on perjured testimony, “the trial court 
must make findings to support all the elements of a perjury 
violation in the specific case.” 507 U.S. at 97. Pursuant to this 
directive, we have repeatedly vacated sentences and 
remanded where district courts applied the perjury 
enhancement without making an express finding that the 
defendant committed perjury. See, e.g., United States v. 
McLaughlin, 126 F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1997); United States 
v. Fiorelli, 133 F.3d 218, 224 (3d Cir. 1998). Cf. Miller, 527 
F.3d at 78–79 (noting Dunnigan’s requirement that trial 
courts make “independent findings” on each element of 
perjury, but ultimately vacating because the prosecution’s 
questions at trial were not sufficiently precise to form a 
predicate for the enhancement).
8
  
 Napolitan argues that Dunnigan is inapplicable 
because it involved a defendant’s appeal from a judgment of 
                                                 
8
  We have noted that “it is preferable for a district court 
to address each element of the alleged perjury in a separate 
and clear finding”—i.e., to specifically make findings that the 
defendant (1) gave false testimony (2) concerning a material 
matter (3) with the willful intent to provide false testimony. 
Boggi, 74 F.3d at 479 (quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95). 
However, we do not require separate findings on each 
individual element if “the court makes a finding that 
encompasses all of the factual predicates for a finding of 
perjury.” Id. (quoting Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 95); see also 
United States v. Gricco, 277 F.3d 339, 362 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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sentence that included a two-level enhancement under § 
3C1.1, not the converse situation presented here, where the 
government brings an appeal challenging a district court’s 
rejection of the enhancement. Although Dunnigan did not 
address the situation that we confront, the Government 
contends that the requirement to make explicit factual 
findings should operate with equal force when a district court 
declines to apply the enhancement.  
We are not persuaded that Dunnigan controls here. 
The fact-finding requirement set forth in Dunnigan was 
rooted in a concern that “fear of an unjustified enhancement 
may chill exercise of the defendant’s constitutional right to 
testify in his own defense.” Fiorelli, 133 F.3d at 221 (citing 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 97) (emphasis added). Requiring a 
sentencing court to explicitly find that the defendant 
committed perjury alleviates that concern because it helps to 
ensure the enhancement is imposed only if the government 
establishes that the defendant committed perjury—i.e., gave 
false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to mislead the jury. See United States v. Alvarado-
Guizar, 361 F.3d 597, 606 (9th Cir. 2004) (noting that 
Dunnigan’s fact-finding requirement provides a “procedural 
safeguard designed to prevent punishing a defendant for 
exercising her constitutional right to testify”). But the same 
concerns underpinning Dunnigan’s rule are not implicated 
when the enhancement is being rejected. As the Ninth Circuit 
explained: 
Unlike a testifying criminal defendant, the 
government does not face the risk of automatic 
punishment for its witnesses’ testimony in an 
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unsuccessful trial, nor does it have a 
constitutional or statutory right similar to the 
accused’s with respect to trial testimony. 
Simply put, the government does not face the 
dangers that Dunnigan’s requirement of factual 
findings is designed to prevent. 
Id.  
For this reason, several of our sister circuits have held 
that there is no requirement for a district court to make factual 
findings when electing not to apply § 3C1.1. See United 
States v. Vegas, 27 F.3d 773, 783 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Dunnigan 
does not suggest that the court make findings to support its 
decision against the enhancement.”) (emphasis in original); 
Alvarado-Guizar, 361 F.3d at 606 (“There is no parallel that 
requires the same result when a defendant is not receiving a 
longer sentence.”). We agree with these courts that Dunnigan 
does not compel explicit factual findings when a sentencing 
judge decides not to impose the perjury enhancement.  
Nevertheless, the fact that Dunnigan does not entitle 
the government to specific factual findings does not mean that 
such findings are without jurisprudential value. Our decisions 
“place a premium on thorough explication of sentencing 
decisions.” United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 572 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc). And we have routinely instructed that 
sentencing judges must create a record showing that their 
decisions are “the product of comprehensive and thoughtful 
deliberation.” Id. See United States v. Palma, 760 F.2d 475, 
480 (3d Cir. 1985) (noting “the importance of the district 
court’s making findings of fact to facilitate meaningful 
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appellate review of its discretionary ruling”); cf. Jackson v. 
Danberg, 594 F.3d 210, 230 (3d Cir. 2010) (noting that a 
court’s failure to articulate reasons for its conclusion “makes 
our role as a reviewing court needlessly arduous, and 
sometimes even practically impossible”). As we have 
explained, “[a] reasoned and rational justification for a 
sentence is necessary to assure the parties of the fairness of 
the proceedings, to instill public confidence in the judicial 
process, and to allow for effective appellate review.” Grier, 
475 F.3d at 572. We see no reason why the importance of “a 
reasoned and rational justification” is diminished when a 
court declines to impose a requested enhancement.  
 The Fifth Circuit addressed this same sentiment in 
United States v. Humphrey, 7 F.3d 1186, 1190 (5th Cir. 
1993): 
Although this result is not explicitly compelled 
by Dunnigan . . . , we find that the district court 
did have an obligation to make a finding of 
whether Humphrey committed perjury in its 
consideration of the government’s objection. 
We see little merit in Humphrey’s contention 
that the district court is only required to make 
specific findings when addressing objections 
made by a defendant. Implicit in the 
government’s right to object to guideline 
determinations, and our obligation to review 
those determinations, is the district court’s 
obligation to make all factual findings necessary 
to establish the basis for its decisions. 
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See also United States v. Tracy, 989 F.2d 1279, 1290 (1st Cir. 
1993) (vacating the sentence and remanding to the district 
court “to make findings to support all the elements of a 
perjury violation, or to articulate clearly the elements it 
believes have not been satisfied”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). We agree with Humphrey that we cannot fulfill our 
obligation to review Guideline determinations unless the 
reasoning underlying the court’s conclusion is readily 
discernible from the record. We thus exercise our supervisory 
power to hold that, in evaluating whether to apply the perjury 
enhancement under § 3C1.1, a district court must make an 
explicit factual finding that the defendant did or did not give 
false testimony concerning a material matter with the willful 
intent to mislead the jury. See Palma, 760 F.2d at 480 (noting 
our “supervisory power to require district courts in the future 
to make specific findings as to the factual issues that are 
relevant” to a particular sentencing decision). 
Turning to the record before us, we conclude that the 
Court’s statement, “I don’t know that the record supports it,” 
is not a sufficient articulation of its reason for refusing to 
apply § 3C1.1. Significantly, this remark does not set forth 
the Court’s finding with respect to the critical issue—whether 
Napolitan committed perjury. The Court may have been 
disinclined to impose the enhancement in light of the 
revelation at sentencing that Rodemoyer had in fact ordered a 
key to the safe. Or maybe the Court’s decision was based on 
its noted perception that Rodemoyer lacked credibility. See 
app. 480 (stating that the Court “questioned the credibility of 
Miss Rodemoyer” during trial and sentencing). Yet these are 
not proper reasons for denying the enhancement if Napolitan 
did, in fact, commit perjury. Application of § 3C1.1 is not 
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discretionary. If a district court determines that an “accused 
has committed perjury at trial, an enhancement is required.” 
Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 98. Conversely, if the defendant did 
not commit perjury, the enhancement should be rejected.  
The District Court’s suggestion of agnosticism on the 
question of Napolitan’s possible perjury does not provide us 
with a sound basis for review. On remand, the District Court 
must make a finding as to whether the Government has met 
its burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the defendant perjured himself. The District Court must either 
make findings to support all the elements of a perjury 
violation, or clearly express which elements it believes have 
not been proven. In evaluating the falsity of Napolitan’s 
testimony, “the sentencing court [is bound] to accept the facts 
necessarily implicit in the verdict.” Boggi, 74 F.3d at 479. If 
the record also provides support for findings that a false 
statement was material and willful, the enhancement must be 
applied. Dunnigan, 507 U.S. at 98 (“Upon a proper 
determination that the accused has committed perjury at trial, 
an enhancement of sentence is required by the Sentencing 
Guidelines.”). 
IV. 
 For the reasons provided, we will affirm Napolitan’s 
conviction, but will vacate his sentence and remand for 
resentencing in accordance with this opinion. 
